Sunshine Act Alert: Governing Bodies Can Use Majority Vote Clause

By Patrick M. McKenna, Esq.
Gawthrop Greenwood, PC

A deeply divided PA Supreme Court issued a decision on November 24, 2025 in Coleman v. Parkland School District, No. 33 MAP 2024. The decision revolved around interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act, Notification of Agency Business Required and Exceptions.

Case Background

Failure to include an item of agency business on the pre-meeting agenda generally precludes consideration of that business at the agency’s meeting, but the Sunshine Act provides several exceptions t

o this general rule. In this case, the school board approved a collective bargaining agreement that was not listed in the meeting’s agenda notice. The Commonwealth Court held that the school board violated the Sunshine Act, but the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the school board properly invoked an exception to the agenda notice rule. The Commonwealth Court held that Section 712.1 provides only three (3) exceptions to the public notice (agenda) requirements: (1) for emergency business, (2) for de minimis business not involving fund expenditure or entering into a contract that arises within 24 hours preceding meeting, and (3) for de minimis business raised by resident or taxpayer during meeting that does not involve fund expenditure or entering into a contract. The Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of the Act 65 amendments to the Sunshine Act wholly removed the exception which allowed for a municipality, with majority consensus, to amend the agenda and subsequently act on an item.

Majority Opinion of PA Supreme Court

The Majority held that the plain text of Section 712.1 is unambiguous and creates four freestanding exceptions to the general prohibition that an agency cannot take official action on items not listed on the pre-meeting agenda pursuant to the 24-hour Notice Rule. Because the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Majority refused to engage in a statutory interpretation analysis, refusing to invoke the Rules of Statutory Interpretation. The decision came down to the meaning of the term “or” in section 712.1(a), with the Court utilizing its plain disjunctive meaning indicating there are four exceptions to the prohibition set forth in Section 712.1(b) through (e). The Majority opinion, authored by Justice Donohue, was joined in by Justices Dougherty and Mundy, while portions of the majority decision were joined in by Justice Brobson, who also issued a concurring opinion. Justice Todd issued a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Wecht which was joined in by Justice McCaffery.

Section 712.1(e), referred to as the Majority Vote Clause, may properly be invoked by an agency so long as the agency conducts a wholly separate vote from that which decides the new business, and the reasons for the change to the agenda must be announced at the meeting before any vote is conducted. Only if that vote is successful may the agency, then take official action on the matter added to the agenda. The Majority Vote Clause is not constrained by time restrictions like those imposed under Section 712.1(c) or (d), nor does it require that the new matter involve a true emergency like Section 712.1(b). When an agency chooses to invoke the Majority Vote Clause, it must do so transparently during the meeting by a wholly separate vote from the vote that decides the new matter. When the agency invokes the Majority Vote Clause, it must post the amended agenda on the agency’s publicly accessible website, if available, and at the agency’s principal office location no later than the first business day following the meeting at which the agenda was changed. Moreover, when a matter is added to the agenda, the minutes of the meeting shall reflect the substance of the matter added, the vote on the addition and the announced reasons for the addition.

Dissenting Opinion of PA Supreme Court

The dissent was uncomfortable with the majority’s view on the breadth of the Majority Vote Clause, writing that the four-exception account is incompatible with the thrust and intention of the Sunshine Act, and especially that of the 2021 Amendments. According to the dissent, the majority’s reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that a governing body can pursue any unnoticed business it wants for no better reason than that a majority of that body feels like it. The dissent believes that no non-emergent matter of immediate or lasting consequence, especially fiscal, may be taken up without advance notice to the public of the agency’s intention to do so.

Effect on Governing Bodies

The bottom line is that with this decision, the Majority Vote Clause is again effective and an option for governing bodies, subject to the procedural requirements of the Act to vote to amend the agenda to include the item, a statement of the reasons for the addition to the agenda, and the post meeting requirements to post the amended agenda to the governing body’s website and building no later than the first business day following the meeting and to update the meeting minutes to reflect the substance of the matter added, the vote on the addition and the reasons for the addition.

Patrick M. McKenna is a partner and leader of the Municipal Law Department at Gawthrop Greenwood, where he has served a multitude of municipalities for more than 20 years. Most recently, his decades-long role as solicitor of Westtown Township helped ensure the preservation of the historic Crebilly Farm property. For more information, contact Patrick at pmckenna@gawthrop.com or 610-696-8225.